USA v. Shanika Davis by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-16-2014 
USA v. Shanika Davis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Shanika Davis" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 967. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/967 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1147 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
  
SHANIKA DAVIS,  
                                 Appellant  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 1-13-cr-00283-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 8, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 16, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Shanika Davis appeals the District Court’s fifteen-month prison sentence for her 
violation of probation.  She argues that the District Court erred in considering conduct 
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other than that to which she admitted and as a result imposed a procedurally unreasonable 
sentence.  We disagree and will affirm.   
I 
 As we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  On May 8, 2006, Davis pleaded guilty in the Southern 
District of New York to criminal charges arising from her straw purchase of a firearm.1   
Davis fled from bail supervision and was not sentenced until February 2009.  She was 
sentenced to two years’ probation.  Davis absconded from her probation supervision in 
October 2009 and remained a fugitive until May 2011.  Davis’s case and supervision 
were transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and on June 1, 2011, that Court 
found that Davis had violated probation and re-sentenced her to three years’ probation, 
beginning with six months’ home confinement.  Two months later, Davis’s case and 
supervision were once again transferred, this time to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  
Davis violated her probation again, and in January 2012, the District Court there 
sentenced her to an additional six months’ home confinement.  
 In April 2013, Davis was again arrested for violating conditions of probation.  
According to the “Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision” 
(the Petition”), Davis allegedly had been convicted of receiving a stolen pistol, 
fraudulently obtaining food stamps and welfare benefits, and issuing bad checks while on 
probation.  The Petition also alleged that Davis had committed numerous “technical 
                                              
1 Specifically, Davis pleaded to: (1) conspiracy to transport firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) illegal 
transportation of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5); and (3) making false statements in connection with 
the acquisition of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).   
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violations” including possessing drugs, failing to report to her probation officer, failing to 
respond honestly to inquiries from her probation officer, removing her location 
monitoring transmitter, and associating with Rashawn Collier, a known felon.  At the 
violation hearing, Davis admitted to having been convicted of the state crimes, which 
constituted Grade B violations, but did not admit to the technical violations, and the 
Government did not introduce any additional evidence relating to them.  Davis’s counsel 
did, however, acknowledge that Davis had associated with Collier.  
 Davis’s Guidelines range was four to ten months’ imprisonment.  The Government 
moved for an upward variance from Davis’s calculated Guidelines range based on (1) 
Davis’s inability to comply with the terms of her probation, (2) the fact that drugs were 
found in her home, and (3) her possession of the stolen pistol.  
 The District Court granted the Government’s motion and sentenced Davis to 
fifteen months’ imprisonment, five months above her Guidelines range.  Explaining the 
chosen sentence, the District Court said:  
Ms. Davis has been completely incorrigible and displayed a 
blatant disregard for the conditions of two separate 
supervisions.  Less than three months after appearing before 
this Court and being warned of the consequences of further 
noncompliance, police apprehended a fugitive, Rashawn 
Collier, from inside the offender’s residence.  Drugs, grow 
materials, and [a] stolen firearm were seized.  
 
Ms. Davis removed her location monitoring transmitter 
claiming medical issues and visited Mr. Collier at SCI Camp 
Hill.  Plus Ms. Davis placed hundreds of telephone calls with 
Collier and deposited money into his prison account.  This 
was in violation of an admonition from this Court.  This 
conduct clearly illustrates the offender’s failure to favorably 
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respond to all the opportunities extended to her from the start 
of her federal case. 
 
And the Court does recognize that she has been convicted of 
welfare fraud and bad checks while under supervision and she 
has also been a fugitive at times. The offender failed to 
honestly respond to even basic inquiries from the probation 
office. 
 
Now there is a strong need for [the] sentence imposed to 
provide adequate punishment for Ms. Davis’s violation and to 
deter from future crimes. At the time of her original sentence, 
this Court departed downward. Plus Ms. Davis twice had her 
probation revoked, but managed to avoid imprisonment. An 
upward departure, the Court believes, is warranted. 
 
App. 26-27.   
 Davis appeals her sentence, arguing that her sentence is procedurally unreasonable 
because the District Court relied partly on the technical violations concerning (1) the fact 
that drugs were found in her home; (2) her failure to respond honestly to her probation 
officer; and (3) her removal of her location monitoring transmitter.2  Davis contends that 
the District Court erred in relying on these allegations because Davis did not admit to 
them and she claims they lack evidentiary support.   
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
 As Davis did not object to the District Court’s reference to Davis’s technical 
violations at sentencing, we review the sentence for plain error.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  
                                              
2 Davis’s association with Collier also constituted a technical violation and she conceded to have in fact associated 
with him. 
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Under the plain error standard, we will affirm the sentence unless the appellant 
demonstrates: (1) an error; (2) that is clear and obvious; and (3) that affects substantial 
rights.  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Vazquez, 271 
F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2001).  If all three prongs are satisfied, then the Court has the 
discretion to remedy the error only if the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (quotation marks 
omitted); United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2013).   
III 
 To address Davis’s claim, we must determine whether it was error for the District 
Court to rely on information in the Petition.  While the information in the Petition is 
hearsay, hearsay statements are admissible at sentencing so long as the statements “bear 
some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.”  United States v. Smith, 
751 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).  The statements contained in 
the Petition satisfy that standard.  The probation officer authored the Petition and had 
personal knowledge of much of its contents based upon his interaction with Davis.  
Moreover, the Petition is “replete with detail[s]” of Davis’s incorrigible behavior.  See 
United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 345 (3d Cir. 2009).  Finally, and most importantly, 
the Petition was signed by its author under penalty of perjury.  See id. (sworn hearsay is 
an indicium of reliability).  For these reasons, we conclude that the Petition had sufficient 
indicia of reliability and that the District Court did not err by referring to statements 
contained therein when fashioning Davis’s sentence. 
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 Even if we assume that the District Court erred in relying on the facts contained in 
the Petition or even if such facts were clearly erroneous, Davis has failed to demonstrate 
that any error “affected [her] substantial rights.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.  To carry her 
burden on this prong, Davis must show prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome 
of the District Court proceedings to her detriment.  Id.; see also Stinson, 734 F.3d at 187 
(an “error that results in a longer sentence undoubtedly affects substantial rights.” 
(quotation marks omitted)).  While the District Court mentioned certain technical 
violations, its upward variance was primarily based on Davis’s earlier violations of both 
pretrial and post-conviction release, the fact she avoided jail in her sentence for the 
original offenses and her earlier violations, her failure to heed prior warnings concerning 
her noncompliance, her commission of crimes while on probation, and the need to punish 
her and deter future violations.  Because the record establishes that the District Court’s 
upward variance was primarily based on these reasons, Davis has not shown that the 
District Court’s consideration of the technical violations caused her prejudice.   
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Davis’s sentence.  
